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THE EMERGENCE OF SELF THROUGH REFLECTION 
Petra Campbell 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis is structured in the form of an historical investigation 
of the dialectic between two different ideas of the self- that it is 
given, and that it is fashioned in a process of self-making. It will be 
argued that both ways of viewing the self are inadequate, generating 
problems that can only be overcome by an alternative view of the self, 
which is presented in the final chapter. At the same time, the dialectic 
between the two ideas in question itself can be shown to move within the 
context of notions about the being of the self, and the belief in a special 
relation between thought and the self. Over time, this belief begins to 
crystallise into an acceptance that there is a relation between reflection 
and the self. As a result of exploring this relation, it will be argued 
that reflection has a structure involving three significant elements, 
namely, introspective mirroring, the retrospective movement of re-
appropriation and expressive force. Once this structure of reflection is 
taken fully into account, it becomes possible to clarify how it functions 
as the source of the self, a self that is finally defined in terms of a 
reflexive activity of consciousness, made determinate by its content. 
The construction of the context, within which the dialectic between 
the ideas that the self is given and that it is self-constituted moves, has 
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its beginnings in the Humanism of the Italian Renaissance, and is captured 
tellingly in the controversial case ofPico della Mirandola. For some 
commentators, Pico held an idea of self-making; others, however, reject 
such an interpretation. But what emerges as important for this thesis is 
that Pico can be shown to connect ideas about the being of the self with 
creation ex nihilo through the word, thus forging a relation between self-
making and thought which has survived and is still operative in 
contemporary views of self-fashioning. However, almost from the start the 
connection Pi co had made became obscured by the influence of Descartes, for 
whom the being of the selfis that of a given substance. Whilst Locke and 
Hume discredited Descartes' conclusion, the idea that the self is an entity 
of some sort continued to exert a powerful influence on later philosophers 
of reflection, like Leibniz and Kant. As a result, the subject-object 
dichotomy became entrenched in Kant, who, it is argued, sees reflection in 
terms of introspection. 
But the role of reflection in relation to a self that is somehow 
given, leads to the idea of the divided self, a division Hegel attempted to 
heal, but at the expense of a significant characteristic of reflection: 
that of mirroring. Fichte, equally dissatisfied with the Kantian view of 
the self, highlights reflection as the means for creating self, in a manner 
that recalls the efforts ofPico. But as a result of his analyses, self 
comes to be seen as the interplay of the finite and the infinite, a notion 
which is carried on in Kierkegaard, yielding contradictions which they 
never resolve. 
Hegel's solution - the destruction of reflection by reflection itself 
-brings about the demise of the individual self. Nevertheless, this 
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demise rests on the traditional assumption - grounded in the metaphysics of 
being- that the self is an original, primordial unity. It is Nietzsche 
who challenges this notion by positing a contradiction at the heart of the 
world, a contradiction which results in the idea that being is imposed as a 
fiction upon what is essentially an indeterminate and inchoate process of 
becoming. Within this framework self is seen as an invention. 
In the course of this historical development the inadequacy of the 
notion of the self as given becomes ever more evident. That is because 
reflection inevitably, and always, splits such a self into subject and 
object. The problems generated as a result can only be overcome by 
accepting the idea that it is reflection which brings the self into being. 
Exploring how this comes about is the topic of the final chapter, which 
introduces the idea of the reflexive self, and distinguishes this latter 
idea from notions of self-constitution put forward by Habermas and 
Foucault. 
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